EDITORIAL by unknown
YALE LAw JOURNAL
SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $2.50 A YEAR. SINGLE COPIES, 35 CENTS.
EDITORIAL BOARD
PAUL ROBINSON BARTLETT, Chairman
JOHN W. LOWRANCE, HIRAM STEELMAN,
Business Manager Secretary
HERSCHEL W. ARANT, ALBERT J. HARNO,
BENTON BAKER, WILLIAM F. HEALEY,
PHILIP B. BUZZELL, GEORGE R. JACKSON,
JOHN F. COLLINS, VINCENT L. KEATING,
HOWARD W. CURTIS, CLAUDE B. MAXFIELD,
CARROLL C. HINCKS, GEORGE F. TURNER.
BUCKINGHAM P. MERRIMAN.
Published monthly during the Academic year, by students of the Yale Law School.
P. 0. Address, Drawer Q, Yale Station, New Haven, Conn.
If a subscriber wishes his-copy of the JOURNAL discontinued at the expiration of
his subscription, notice to that effect should be sent; otherwise, it is assumed that a
continuation of the subscription is desired.
REASONABLENESS OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANT IN CONTRACT FOR
PERSONAL SERVICES.
The Court of Appeal in England in the recently decided case of
Bastes v. Russ,' denied relief in an action by a pathologist con-
ducting a large laboratory to restrain a former assistant, who, at
the commencement of his employment, contracted not to engage
in similar work within a distance of ten miles from the plaintiff's
laboratory but after six years of service left the plaintiff's employ
and established a laboratory of his own within the prohibited area,
from carrying on or being engaged in that work. The area of ten
miles covered the entire city of London. At the time the agree-
ment was made the defendant was, and he still is, a young man.
He admitted that during the time he was with the plaintiff he had
many introductions to medical men; that where he had started
practice he had opportunities of obtaining the plaintiff's clients,
many of whom he had circularized; and that his opposition might
be serious for the plaintiff in the course of time.
The points raised in the case were: First, that according to the
true construction of the terms of the defendant's engagement he
1 110 Law Times, 296.
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was only precluded from engaging in similar work during his em-
ployment with the .plaintiff. Second, that if the defendant's con-
struction 6f the terms of engagement was not correct, he was mis-
taken as to the meaning of the terms which were written by the
plaintiff, and he ought to be relieved from the consequences of his
mistake. Third, that the restriction is wider than reasonably
necessary for the plaintiff's protection, and, therefore, void. The
trial court thought that the restriction was not void as being un-
necessarily wide, for the defendant could not set up an establish-
ment within the restricted area without competing to a consider-
able extent with that carried on by the plaintiff, and furthermore
the plaintiff might very likely desire to increase his establishment;
but considered the words of the agreement to be at least fully sat-
isfied by the imposition on the defendant of an obligation not to
engage in similar work during the time he was employed by the
plaintiff, and further, ambiguous within the doctrine of Falck v.
Williams,2 that where there is such an ambiguity in a: document
that it may be properly understood by the defendant in a sense.
different- from that which the court does ultimately put upon it,
and the ambiguity is caused by some want of care on the part of
the plaintiff, recovery cannot be had by the latter even at law.
Judgment dismissing the action was sustained by the Court of
Appeal but the reasons above stated were disapproved. The obli-
gation was considered by the entire court as imposed upon the
defendant during his entire life. Following the doctrine of
Tamplin v. James3 and Wilding vs. Sanderson4 the defendant was
denied relief on the ground of mistake, there having been no mis-
representation and no ambiguity. Two members of the court,
however, considered the restraint unreasonable in going beyond
what was necessary for the protection of the plaintiff and, there-
fore, invalid upon the authority of Mason v. Provident Clothing
and Supply Co.," and earlier cases.8 The third member of the
court dissented on this point, contending that the burden of prov-
ing the restraint unreasonable is upon the defendant alleging it,
2 1900 A. C. 176.
343 Law Times 520; 15 Ch. Div. 215.
4 77 Law Times 57; 1897, 2 Ch. 534.
7,109 Law Times 449; 1913, A. C. 724.
"Nordenfelt Case, 71 L. T. 489; 1894, A. C. 535, 568; Leng & Co. v.
Andrews, 100 L. T. 7; 1909, 1 Ch. 763; Proctor v. Sargent, 2 M. & G. 20,33.
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and cited several early cases to substantiate his contentions.
It is a well-settled rule of construction that words will be con-
strued most strongly against the party who used them.8 In the
case before us, the restrictive agreement was made at the com-
mencement of defendant's term of service, which, as has been
stated, was unspecified; there is no indication from the words
used when the restriction was to apply; the defendant simply was
"not to engage in similar work". True it is that it is a general
rule that where no time has been specified for the duration of a
restriction it has been held that the restriction shall operate for
the lifetime of the covenantor ;O nevertheless, in all the cases on
the point which we have examined there has been some indication
of when the restriction was to apply and that it was intended to
hold the party for the remainder of his life; as, e. g., "in the event
of dissolution", "at any time thereafter", "after the termination
of employment", etc. ;1-0 and we are led to agree with the trial
court that the words of the agreement were fully satisfied by
limiting the restriction to the period of employment. But even
if the construction of the plaintiff is the proper one, the trial
court is justified in its holding on the second point under the
authority of Higginson v. Clowes." In that case, where the con-
ditions of a sale were likely to have misled the defendant, and the
latter contended for a different construction from that of the
plaintiff, the court offered the plaintiff the option of having his
bill dismissed or of having the contract executed on the defend-
ant's construction.
The rule was laid down in the Nordenfelt Case12 that it is for
the employer to satisfy the court that the restriction goes no fur-
ther than is reasonable for the protection of his business and not
for the servant to show that it is unreasonable; and this rule was
7Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Ad. & El. 438; Chesinan v. Nainby,. 2 Str. 739;
Mallan v. May, 11 M. & W. 653; Mumford v. Gething, 7 C. B. N. S. 305.
s Fowkes v. Assurance Ais'n, 3 B. & S. 925.
0 Jacoby v. Whitmore, 49 L. T. N. S. 335; Hauser v. Harding, 126 N.
C. 295; Carl v. Snyder, 26 AtI. 977 (N. J.).
10 Hitchcock v. Coker, supra; Price v. Green, 16 M. & W. 346; Jacoby
v. Whitmore, supra; Bunn v. Guty, 4 East 190; Rakestraw v. Lanier, 104
Ga. 188; Mandeville v. Harman, 42 N. J. Eq. 185; Turner v. Abbott, 116
Tenn. 718.
111 5 Vesey 516.
12 Supra.
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approved by the House of Lords very recently.13 The earlier
cases in so far as they are contrary to this must be conj
sidered as overruled, notwithstanding the fact that they were not
specifically mentioned.
If we concede that the agreement not to engage in similar work
was to be binding upon the defendant during his lifetime, then we
agree with the Court of Appeal that the restriction is void because
not reasonably necessary for the protection of the plaintiff. "The
true view at the present time * * * is this. The public have an
interest in every person's carrying on his trade freely; so has the
individual. All interference with individual liberty of action in
trading, and all restraints of trade of themselves, if there is noth-
ing more, are contrary to public policy, and therefore void. That
is the general rule. But there are exceptions; restraints of trade
and interference with individual liberty of action may be justified
by the special circumstances of a particular case. It is a sufficient
justification, and, irdeed, it is the only justification, if the restric-
tion is reasonable-reasonable, that is, in reference to the inter-
ests of the parties concerned and reasonable in reference to the
interests of the public, so framed and so guarded as to afford
adequate protection to the party in whose favor it is imposed,
while at the same time it is in no way injurious to the public."'14
In arriving at the conclusion that the prohibition for life over
so large an area-the entire city of London-was larger than was
necessary for the protection of the plaintiff, the court hinted at a
distinction between contracts of service and contracts of sale of
good-will, saying that in the former the employer "is only entitled
to a covenant so limited as to time and place as to deprive the
employee of any and every benefit which might accrue to him in
the way of connection or reputation or personal knowledge of the
customers and so strip him bare of all advantage and put him on
the same level as a stranger." This would seem to be simply an
attempt to define what is reasonable protection and we are unable
to distinguish between the two classes of contracts in this respect.
Each case should be determined upon the peculiar circumstances
existing therein. An examination of cases on the point shows
that there is no unanimity of opinion in the matter."5
1"1 Supra:
'14 Nordenfelt Case, supra at page 565; quoted with approval in the
Mason Case, supra, at page 733.
15 For general reasonableness of restriction in particular cases, see
Williston Wald's Pollock on Contracts, 3rd ed., 362; also note 10, supra.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
In the case at hand the defendant was a young man embarking
in a new branch of the medical profession and his term of em-
ployment was uncertain. For these reasons the restriction was
unnecessarily large and the Court of Appeal properly held it to be
void.
LIABILITY FOR FORGED SIGNATURE ON TRAVELER'S CHECK.
In the case of Sullivan v. Knauth, 146 N. Y. S. 583, the Appel-
late Division of the Supreme Court of New York recently dealt
with a question concerning commercial paper entirely novel in
some respects. The plaintiff had purchased traveler's checks of
the defendant through its agent, the amounts of which the de-
fendant promised to pay through its correspondent against the
checks when countersigned by the plaintiff. The checks were lost
and, the plaintiff's courntersignature having been forged, the de-
fendant paid them. In an action to recover the amount of the
checks paid, the court allowed a recovery, basing its decision on
the ground that the countersignature performed the same func-
tion as to that instrument which the name of the payee of an
order check does when placed on the back-of it, in which latter
case the bank is liable if it pays when the indorsement is a forgery.
The business of selling traveler's checks is of recent origin,
having been developed as a result of the necessities of the exten-
sive travel of late years. By resorting to their use the traveler
obviates the necessity of carrying a large amount of money with
him and escapes its attendant danger of loss and yet is enabled to
procure money as he needs it in any state or foreign country by
simply writing his name in the place for his countersignature just
as he wrote it in the space for the "holder's" signature when he
made the purchase.
The decision of the principal case simply involved the applica-
tion of a familiar principal of law to an entirely novel set of facts
which presented one of the numerous recent commercial devel-
opments. It is well settled that if A draws a check payable to B
and delivers it to B, and C forges B's indorsement and gets the
money, B can recover from the bank if the amount has been
charged to the drawer.' The reason for this is that the bank
has a check the title to which is still in B, because a forged in-
dorsement does not operate to pass title to a check. Hence B
Welsh v. German American Bank, 73 N. y. 424.
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can sue the bank in an action sounding in tort for the conversion
of his check. It is equally well settled that if A draws a check
payable to B and B presents it to the bank for payment, A having
sufficient funds at the time, and payment is refused, B cannot sue
the bank. There is no privity of contract between B and the bank
and the check does not operate as an assignment to B of so much
of the money which the bank owes to A. 2 It is held every-
where, however, that A has a right of action against the bank.
Between him and the bank there is privity of contract. When A
became the bank's depositor it undertook to make payment ac-
cording to his order so long as he had funds enough. In refusing
to make payment accordingly a right of action accrues to A.3
With these observations in mind, let us examine some of the
statements of the court in the principal case. Clarke, J., says:
"The plaintiff procured these checks from the defendant's agents,
hence, from them. In my opinion a relation cognate to that of
depositor and banker should be considered to have been estab-
lished between the plaintiff and these defendants. If that is not
the effect of the transaction, the traveler obtains little advantage
from these so-called traveler's checks and might as well carry
bills or gold. The basis of his purchase is protection by reason of
the double signature. * * * It seems to me, therefore, that it must
be held that it is the second signature which gives the paper final
currency. It is in the precise situation of a check payable to the
order of a designated payee unindorsed by said payee. That be-.
ing so, the countersigned- signature must be treated as the ordi-
nary indorsement of a payee upon an ordinary check; that is, the
bank is responsible if it pays on a forgery." Certain words in the
check in question, "Knauth, Nachod & Kuhne, New York,
through their correspondent will pay against this check out of
their balance," leave the precise relation of the correspondent to
the defendants to some extent a matter of conjecture. The trav-
eler's check issued by the American Express Company- reads,
"The American Express Company at its paying agencies will
pay", etc. Let-us suppose first that the correspondent of the de-
fendants bears to them the same relation as the paying agency of
the Express Company; that is, it is simply one of their offices,
a component part of the defendant and under the direction of its
3 Hopkinson v. Foster, supra.
2 Bank of the Republic zr. Millard, 10 Wall. 152; Hopkinson v. Foster,
L. R. 19 Eq. 74; "National Commercial Bank v. Miller, 77 Ala. 168.
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directors. (The first part of the quotation above indicates that
the Court considered this to be the relation.) Then we will sup-
pose that the correspondent holds funds of the defendant so that
the same relation exists as in the case of the ordinary bank and
one who deposits money with it.
In the first case the defendant itself undertakes to pay directly.
Suppose now that A has an uncountersigned traveler's check
which he has purchased of a bank and suppose that B at the same
time holds an ordinary check drawn by A in his favor on the
same bank. Between A and the bank there is a contract relation
but between B and the bank there is none. If A countersigns his
traveler's check and the bank refuses to pay it, he has a right of
action for breach of contract. If B indorses his check and pay-
ment is refused he has no right of action because the bank has
broken no contract with him and has denied him nothing which
legally belongs to him, the check not operating as an assignment:
If A's countersignature is forged and the bank pays the forger,
A can sue in assumpsit for the breach of the contract to pay to
his order. If B's indorsement is forged and payment is made by
the bank, he can demand his check to which the bank has ac-
quired no title, and, if it is refused, he may sue for. its conversion.
In the first case the action is in contract; in the second it is in
tort. Prior to countersignature the holder sustains such a rela-
tion to the bank that by countersigning he can make an order on
the bank and recover damages if they refuse to obey it. The
payee of the check cannot by indorsing make an order on the bank
which will entitle him to damages if payment is refused. Hence,
if the relation of the defendant's correspondents to them con-
formed to the supposition we here make there would be a vital
difference between the situation of a holder of an uncounter-
signed traveler's check and that of the payee of an order check
who holds it still unindorsed. It would be more accurate to say
that the countersignature on the traveler's check here is the
drawer's signature on the ordinary check.
Let us now deal with the situation under the second supposi-
tion, namely, that the defendants sustained the relation of de-
positor to the bank called its correspondent. A now holds a so-
called traveler's check which is in the nature of a draft. The
bank selling is the drawer, the correspondent is the drawee, and
the purchaser is the payee. Now it can be seen that there is no
privity of contract between A and the correspondent bank any
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more than there is between B and the bank on which the order
check he holds is drawn. A countersigns and B indorses and
payment is refused both. Neither A nor B can sue the bank be-
cause there is no privity of contract. Let us now suppose that
A's countersignature and B's indorsement are forged and pay-
ment is made. Both have a right of action in tort for the con-
version of their property, demand having been made upon the
bank. Hence, if in fact the relation of the correspondent to the
defendant in the principal case was as supposed here, the Court
is accurate in its statements.
From what has been said it will be seen that it makes no dif-
ference under the facts of the principal case whether the coun-
tersignature on the check in question be the signature of a drawer
or of an indorser. The bank is liable in both cases if it pays when
such signature is forged. It is clear, however, that if the first
supposition we have made is the real situation in the principal
case the holder of the uncountersigned traveler's check is not "in
the precise situation of the payee of an order check who holds it
.still unindorsed."
No authority directly in point can be found, but two decisions
noticed are of interest.
The Supreme Court of Michigan refused to allow the plaintiff
to recover on a traveler's check where the countersignature had a
line drawn through it by the purchaser whose name appeared in
the upper space.4 The Court said, "Checks of a like character to
this one have come into very general use, especially by travelers.
They are an ingenious, safe, and convenient method by which the
traveler may supply himself with funds in almost all parts of the
civilized world, without the hazard of carrying the money on his
person. The company has the right to refuse to pay the check
when it does not bear the countersign agreed upon. The owner
of the check also has the right to insist that it shall not be paid
when it is not countersigned as agreed. This check was not so
countersigned, and for that reason the plaintiff cannot recover."
The Code of California provides that, "One who writes his
name on a negotiable instrument other than as maker pr acceptor
and delivers it with his name thereon to another person is called
an indorser and his act is called indorsement."5  In People v.
4 Samberg v. AdamsExpress Company, 136 Mich. 639, 99 N. W. 879.
SCivil Code, Sec. 3108.
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Prather, which arose under that statute, the information alleged
that the defendant feloniously made and forged "a certain in-
dorsement" of a traveler's check "by then and there indorsing
thereon the name of A. Thompson." It was proved on trial that
the defendant had written the name of A. Thompson on a trav-
eler's check in the lower space left blank for the countersignature
of the purchaser. It was held that this was an indorsement and
that there was no variance.6
PROXIMATE CAUSE IN CIVIL ACTIONS.
When a person has committed a wrongful act he is responsible
for all the damage Which is the natural and probable consequence
of the wrongful act, whether such damage was in fact foreseen
or not.' All other damage is said to be remote and no liability
attaches to the wrongdoer for such other damage, for the reason
aptly stated in the case of Hoag v. Lake Shore, etc., Ry. Co., 85
Pa. St. 293, 298, that "a man's responsibility must stop some-
where". Damage is natural and probable when under the same
or similar circumstances such a result was to have been reason-
ably expected by an ordinarily prudent man.2
Some of the courts have attempted to make a distinction be-
tween remote and proximate cause dependent upon whether or
not the chain of events leading from the wrongful act to the
damage complained of was broken by the intervention of some
new and independent agency.3 The better doctrine and that sup-
ported by the weight of authority is that no such distinction
should be drawn. The only difference which an intervening
agency brings into the case is a greater complication in the facts.
If the damage would not have resulted but for the new agency,
then the original wrongdoer is not responsible unless he should
have reasonably anticipated the intervention of such agency and
the resulting damage. In other words, if the intervening agency
6 139 Pac. 664.
1 Hill v. Winsor, 118 Mass. 251; Wetmore v. Lyman, 2 Root (Conn.)
484; Randall v. Newson, 2 Q. B. D. 102.
2 Atkinson v. Goodrich Tr. Co., 60 Wis. 141, 50 Am. Rep. 352; Marble
v. Worcester, 4 Gray (Mass.) 395.
3 A proximate cause is one which, in natural sequence, undisturbed by
any independent cause, produces the result complained of. Behling v. S.
11. Penn. Pipe Lines, 160 Pa. St. 359, 28 Atl. 777, 40 Am. St. Rep. 724.
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with the resulting damage was a natural and probable outcome of
the original wrongful act, the original wrongdoer is liable.,
Whether the damage complained of was a natural and probable
consequence of the defendant's act is a question of fact for the
jury,5 but whether there is any reasonable evidence of its being
so, to go before the jury, is a preliminary question of law for the
judge.0
The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District, in the re-
cent case of Hartner v. Boston Store,7 held that the sale of a small
rifle by the defendant to a boy fifteen years of age, in violation
of an ordinance, was not the proximate cause of an injury to the
plaintiff resulting from the discharge of the rifle by the boy. The
court affirmed the action of the lower court in giving a peremp-
tory instruction in favor of the defendant.
Similar cases have arisen in Iowa and Indiana. In the case
Poland v. Earhart, 70 Iowa 285, the defendant in -violation of a
statute, sold a revolver to the plaintiff's son, fifteen years old.
The son by accident shot himself through the hand, and the plain-
tiff sued for the loss of his services. The defendant demurred to
the petition and the court sustained the demurrer, holding as a
-matter of law that the defendant could not reasonably have anti-
cipated that an accident would result from the handling of the
revolver from the fact alone that the person to whom he sold it
was a minor. In the case of Binford v. Johnston, 82 Ind. 426, the
complaint alleged that the defendant, in violation of a statute,
sold to two sons of the plaintiff, aged ten and twelve years, ball
cartridges for use in a toy pistol; that the boys left the pistol
loaded with one of the cartridges on the floor of their home,
4 Scott v. Shepard, 2 W. BI. 892, the "Squib Case"; Clark v. Chambers,
3 Q. B. D. 327; Lowry v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 99 N. Y. 158, 1 N. E. 608;
Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136; Pittsfield Cottonware Mfg. Co. v.
Pittsfield Shoe Co., 72 N. H. 546, 58 Atl. 242.
5 Chapman v. Kirby, 49 Ill. 211; Hill v. Winsor, supra; Ehrgoth v.
New York, 96 N. Y. 264 48 Am. Rep. 622.
0 Hoag v. Lake Shore, etc., Ry. Co., 85 Pa. St. 293; Gudfelder v.
Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. Co., 207 Pa. St. 629; Goodlander Mill Co. v.
Standard Oil Co., 63 Fed. 400; Cooley on Torts, 3rd. Ed., p. 111; Sal-
mond, Law of Torts, p. 114. But see Henry v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co.,
which holds that where the facts are undisputed, the question whether a
certain act is the proximate cause of the injury is one of law for the court.
7 No. 18804, March 9, 1914, reported in the 48 National Corporation
Reporter, 345.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
where a younger child, aged six years, picked it up and dis-
charged it, inflicting a wound on one of the other boys from
which he died. The plaintiff sued for loss of services, and ex-
penses incurred in trying to save the wounded boy. The com-
plaint was held good on demurrer, and the court held as a matter
of law that the defendant was liable.
The conflict in these decisions, coupled with the fact that the
prohibition of such sales by statute shows a realization that acci-
dents are at least of possible occurrence, raises a doubt as to the
wisdom of the court in the recent Illinois case and in the Iowa
case in withdrawing the matter from the jury and deciding as a
question of law that an accident is not the natural and probable
consequence of such a sale. The very fact that there is a statute
prohibiting such sales shows that in the judgment of those who
made the statute such sales were so great a source of dafiger that
the public welfare demanded their suppression; and the same
question of public welfare would seem to sanction the courts in
taking the position that a jury might find that the defendant
should have reasonably foreseen such an accident, and the exist-
ence of such a statute seems sufficient to make the question one
of fact for the jury.
MENTAL SUFFERING AS AN ELEMENT OF DAMAGE FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT.
In the recent case of McConnell v. United States Express-Co.,
decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan in March, 1914, the
following facts were found :1 The plaintiff, a middle-aged woman
who was just recovering from a long sickness, had -planned to
join a party of Cook tourists in New York, and with them to
make the trip to Naples, principally for the purpose of restoring
her health. She went to the defendant's office in Pontiac, Michi-
gan, and arranged with the defendant's agent, one Burgis, to have
her trunk, which contained her entire wardrobe for the trip,
transported to the pier in New York, in ample time to catch the
boat. Burgis promised to have it there on time, and knew of the
character of the trip, and that it was Very important that it should
arrive, but it did not appear that he knew of plaintiff's recent ill-
.ness or her specific purpose in making the voyage, or those mental
1 146 N. W. 429.
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and physical peculiarities, upon which considerable, stress is laid
in the opinion. The trunk did not arrive in time, and the plaintiff
was found to have suffered 'considerable physical inconvenience
on the voyage over, as well loss of pleasure and mental anxiety
and annoyance, as a consequence. The trial court allowed the
jury to award damages for this mental suffering, and on appeal
its judgment was affirmed by an evenly divided court, four judges
voting for affirmance, and four for reversal. The precise point of
contention was as to whether or not such damages were in the
contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract,
and the judges who voted for affirmance held that they were. In
order to appreciate the significance of this holding, a somewhat
extended review of the cases becomes necessary.
Any analysis of the elements of damage recoverable in actions
for breach of contract must start with the case of Hadley v.
Baxendale, which defined the damages to be "such as may reason-
ably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties
at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the
breach of it", and which has universally been recognized as laying
down the proper rule. 2 Annoyance, vexation, and mental suffer-
ing, however, were at first, with only one exception, never held
to have been in the contemplation of the parties. This exception
was made in breach of promise cases, and the reason given was
that such contracts dealt primarily with the feelings and sensibili-
ties of the parties.$ Then it began to be felt that certain other
classes of contracts also dealt primarily with the feelings, or at
least that this element was sufficiently prominent to justify the
courts in holding that here, too, mental suffering was, fairly
within the contemplation of the parties. Chief among these were
the so-called "social telegram" cases, where either the sender or
sendee was suing ex contractu for breach of duty in failing to
transmit a death message with sufficient promptness. It should
be noted here that all the cases of this class which are quoted later
were cases where the cause of action was treated by the court as
contractual, although in some of them the sendee of the message
was suing. One or two treated the sender as the agent of the
sendee to deal with the company, while others seemed to regard
the sendee as the real party in interest, or beneficial plaintiff. In
29 Exch. 341.
3 Coolidge v. Neat, 129 Mass. 146.
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all of them, however, the damages were assessed under the rule
in Hadley v. Baxendale. The following are the principal Amer-
ican decisions which have extended the recovery of damages for
mental suffering to contracts other thin those of betrothal.
In the fecent Alabama case of Browning v. Fies, the action was
for breach of contract to provide a hack for the transportation
of plaintiff and his family to the church where his bride was
waiting.4
The Iowa case of Mentzer v. Western Union Tel. Co.; which
was an action for failure to deliver a death message, although
sounding in tort, indicafed clearly, by way of dictum, that the re-
sult would have been the same had the action been contract.5
The Louisiana case of Lewis v. Holmes was an action for the
breach of contract to furnish a trousseau for a bride."
The New York case of Aaron v. Ward was an action of as--
sumpsit, for revocation of a license to enter defendant's bath-
house and expulsion of plaintiff therefrom. 7
The Tennessee case of Wadsworth v. Telegraph Co. was an-
other of the actions for breach of contract to deliver a death mes-
sage.
8
The Texas case of J. E. Dunn & Co. v. Smith was an action
for breach of contract to provide an adequate coffin for one of
plaintiff's family.9
In all these, as well as in the principal case, the jury was al-
lowed to consider the element of mental suffering in assessing
damages. But if we compare the gist of the action in each of
the above cases with that in the principal case, we shall see that
every one of them except the New York decision of Aaron v.
Ward, is far more intimately concerned with the feeling and
sensibilities of the plaintiff, prima facie at least, than the delivery
or non-delivery of a trunk. And it is with the prima facie aspect
of the contract that we have to deal, in the absence of proof that
the defendant in the principal case had notice of the plaintiff's
convalescent condition, and her specific purpose in making the
trip. Assuming that Burgis knew that her entire wardrobe for
458 So. 931.
5 93 Ia. 752.
6 109 La. 1030.
7253 N. Y. 351.
8 86 Tenn. 695.
9 74 S. W. 576.
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the trip was contained in this trunk, and that its arrival was there-
fore of extreme importance, it is still safe to say that the plain-
tiff's feelings and sensibilities were not involved nearly so ob-
viously here, as in any of the cases cited above. Certainly it can-
not be said to have been a contract which dealt primarily with
the emotions. But in other states there is an equally decided'ten-
dency not to extend the recovery of damages for mental suffering.
It may be helpful to cite a few of these decisions.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals case of Wilcox v.
Railroad Co. was an action for the breach of contract to furnish
plaintiff a special train, in order that he might reach a sick
parent.1 0
The Missouri case of Trigg v. Railroad Co. was an action for
the breach of contract in failing to allbw plaintiff to alight at her
station, and in carrying her by."
The later Missouri case of Connell v. Western Union Tel. Co.
was an action for breach of contract to deliver a death message.' 2
The decision here was squarely opposed to the Texas and Ten-
nessee cases.
In the Washington case of Turner v. Great Northern Ry. Co.
the cause of action was the sale by defendant of a through ticket
which was not honored by the connecting cartier.' s
In the Wisconsin case of Walsh v. Railway Co. the action was
for breach of contract to furnish a special train to enable plain-
tiff and others to attend the laying of a cornerstone.' 4
The Federal case and the second Missouri case seem to be con-
trary to the weight of reason and of authority, since in both the
contract dealt primarily with the feelings ,and mental sufferings
ought reasonably to have been contemplated as the result of any
breach. But the other decisions cited above, as refusing damages
for mental suffering, show clearly that the true distinction lies
between contracts which deal primarily with the emotions, and
those in which the vexation and mental suffering are incidental to
the loss of the principal object of the bargain, as understood by
both parties. The principal case would seem to fall more prop-
erly within the second class, inasmuch as the primary object of
10 52 Fed. 264.
".174 Mo: 147.
12 116 Mo. 34.
1 15 Wash. 213.
1442 Wisc. 23.
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the contract was, prima facie, the prompt transportation of prop-
erty. The breach of almost any contract entails a certain amount
of vexation, which varies widely according to the plaintiff's tem-
perament, and it would seem contrary to sound policy, as well as
unjust to the defendant, to attempt the assessment of this element
of damage.
